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Abstract 
 
Japan‘s rural regions have been shrinking for the entire postwar period, and successive 
efforts to revitalize rural society have failed. This article asks whether the Great East 
Japan Earthquake and tsunami, and the subsequent meltdown at the Fukushima Daiichi 
nuclear power plant, present the Japanese state and society with a watershed opportunity 
to rethink regional revitalization and national energy procurement strategies. The article 
begins by summarizing the events of March and April 2011, examines possible 
approaches to the reconstruction of communities in the Tōhoku region, and critiques 
problems of governance in postwar Japan that the disaster reveals. The article concludes 
by pulling together the information and analysis presented into a discussion of the 
prospects for achieving the three point vision for a safe, sustainable, and compassionate 
society that Prime Minister Naoto Kan set the Reconstruction Design Council. 
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The Great East Japan Earthquake, Tsunami and Nuclear Meltdown 
Towards the (Re)Construction of a Safe, Sustainable, and Compassionate Society 
in Japan’s Shrinking Regions 
 
The Great East Japan Earthquake, Tsunami, and Nuclear Meltdown 
At 14:46 local time on 11 March 2011 a magnitude 9.0 reverse fault megathrust 
earthquake struck 100 kilometers east of Miyagi Prefecture in Japan, along the 
subduction zone under the north-western Pacific Ocean where the Pacific and North 
American tectonic plates meet (Map 1)(JMA, 2011a). It was the most powerful 
earthquake ever recorded to have hit the country and the fourth most powerful to have 
occurred anywhere on earth since 1900 (JMA, 2011a; USGS, 2011a). The resulting 
upthrust and subsidence generated a huge tsunami with a maximum recorded height of 
17 meters (Asahi Shinbunsha, 2011a, p. 74) that swept over the low-lying coastal areas 
of the north-eastern seaboard of Honshu, flooding more than 507km
2
 of land and 
leaving 26.7 million tons of debris in its wake (Asahi Shimbunsha, 2011a, p. 74-75). As 
of 5 June 2011 the National Police Agency had registered 15,365 deaths, 8,206 missing, 
and 5,364 people injured across 20 prefectures, and 111,044 destroyed and damaged 
buildings (NPA, 2011). Miyagi, Iwate and Fukushima Prefectures were the worst hit, 
with 9,184, 4,524, and 1,592 deaths respectively (NPA, 2011). Aerial television footage 
showed entire towns being swept away and many residential areas, fishing ports, and 
industrial and commercial zones have been severely damaged or even completely 
destroyed. 
 
The tsunami breached the protective walls at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant 
located in Okuma and Futaba Towns, Fukushima Prefecture, and knocked out the mains 
electricity supply and backup generators that supply the six reactors‘ cooling systems. 
The loss of cooling led to the meltdown of nuclear fuel in reactors 1, 2 and 3, breaches 
in the reactors‘ pressure vessels, ‗melt-through‘ of nuclear fuel into the outer 
containment vessels, hydrogen explosions that tore apart the buildings housing reactors 
1, 3, and 4, and the uncontrolled leak of radioactive materials beyond the vicinity of the 
plant (Asahi Shimbunsha, 2011a; Kyodo News, 2011a; Yomiuri Shimbun, 2011). A 3km 
evacuation zone was immediately established, which was widened to a 10 and then 
20km radius, while residents 20-30km from the plant were urged to remain indoors. By 
11 April 59,310 persons had been evacuated, of whom 39 had died during evacuation 
(Asahi Shinbunsha, 2011a, p. 98). On 21 April the government declared the 20km zone 
a no-go area and those caught ‗trespassing‘, including residents without official 
permission, faced fines of JPY100,000 or 30 days detention (Japan Times, 2011a). 
Residents of Kawamata and Iitate Towns, located 40km from the plant, and parts of 
Katsurao Village, Namie Town and Minamisoma City which lie beyond the 20km 
radius, have also been evacuated due to unsafe radiation levels being detected (BBC, 
2011a; NISA, 2011a). 
 
Map 1: Map of Japan showing the 11 March 2011 Earthquake plus M7+ foreshock and 
aftershocks, other significant earthquakes, and the locations and details of Japan‘s 
nuclear power stations. 
 
Sources: Asahi Shinbunsha (2011b); Electric Power Company websites; JAIF (2011a); 
JMA (2011b); Shinchōsha (2011); Statistics Bureau (2011a); USGS (2011b). 
Note 1: Population data are from the 2010 (and 2005) national census. 
Note 2: Power plant graphics courtesy of Wikipedia under Creative Commons license. 
Note 3: Power plants in red (online version) or with darker symbols (print version) are 
where serious safety breaches or accidents have occurred. 
The Japan Self Defense Force (JSDF) dispatched 100,000 personnel to provide 
emergency aid, while the United States military lent support, including 18,000 
personnel, 20 naval vessels, and 140 aircraft (Fujioka, 2011; Sankei Shimbunsha, 2011, 
p. 77). The Royal Australian Air Force also laid on relief flights (Oldaker, 2011), China 
donated 20,000 tons of gasoline and heavy fuel, South Korea sent boron to stabilize 
Fukushima Daiichi‘s reactors, and many countries sent food supplies and search and 
rescue teams (Reuters, 2011; Sankei Shimbunsha, 2011, p. 77). Although Sendai airport 
was submerged and the terminal building flooded, US soldiers cleaned away the sludge 
and it re-opened on 13 April (Fackler, 2011). East Japan Railways is also restoring rail 
services and by 29 April full service on the Tōhoku Shinkansen had resumed 
(Asahi.com, 2011), links though some local lines remain closed (JR East, 2011). 
Thousands of volunteers have contributed too, and money has been collected from 
around the world. However, the disaster has been overwhelming and the authorities 
have not attended to all needs. Furthermore, restrictions around the Fukushima Diaichi 
power plant inhibit efforts to recover bodies and clear debris. 
 
On 12 April 2011 Japan‘s Nuclear Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) raised the 
seriousness of the nuclear accident to 7 on the International Nuclear Event Scale, 
placing it alongside the catastrophe at Chernobyl in Ukraine in 1986. Initially, the two 
accidents appeared very different, with Fukushima Daiichi reportedly releasing ‗only‘ 
one tenth of the radiation of Chernobyl thus far (JAIF, 2011b; NISA, 2011b), however, 
subsequent reports paint a more ominous picture (Yomiuri Shimbun, 2011). Radioactive 
leakage continues, and on 17 April Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO), owners 
of the plant, estimated that it will take nine months to bring the plant under control 
(TEPCO, 2011a). 
 
Alongside Fukushima Daiichi, all 15 reactors at the Fukushima Daini, Tōkai Daini, 
Onagawa, and Higashidōri nuclear power plants either went into emergency shut down 
or remain offline, while three reactors at the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa plant in Niigata 
Prefecture are offline for inspection, totaling 18 out 22 reactors in the 50Hz region
1
 of 
north-eastern Honshu at a standstill, and representing 76.3 percent (15.74GW ) of the 
nuclear generating capacity of the region (Map 1)(JAIFa, 2011; TEPCO, 2011a; 
Shinchōsha, 2011, p. 64). Engineers from Toshiba and Hitachi, two of the three 
companies that built the reactors and turbines at Fukushima Daiichi (the other being 
General Electric), estimate that it will take between 10 and 30 years to complete 
decommissioning Fukushima Daiichi (NHK, 2011a; Nikkei.com, 2011), which will 
likely cost in excess of JPY1 trillion (USD12 billion) (Tamaki and Toyoda, 2011). 
Currently, the government and TEPCO are considering converting it into a repository 
for the plant‘s spent fuel and debris (Sato, 2011). The wider consequences for nearby 
communities of a continued reminder of what took place there, as well as forever being 
compared with Chernonyl, should not be underestimated. 
 
Seismic activity continues. The main earthquake was preceded by a magnitude 7.2 
foreshock, and by 3 June there had been more than 500 aftershocks of M5+, with 81 of 
these being M6+, and five M7+ (JMA, 2011b). These have caused further damage, 
hindered debris clearance and the restoration of services, and resulted in continuing 
anxiety. It is an unavoidable fact that Japan sits atop the densest seismic network in the 
world at the north-western edge of the Pacific Ring of Fire (USGS, 2011c), and the 
Sanriku coast of Iwate has endured many destructive tsunami. In 1896 the M8.5 
Meiji-Sanriku Earthquake generated a tsunami some 30 meters in height, killing 20,000 
people and destroying nearly 9,000 homes (Nakao, 2005). On 2 March 1933 the M8.4 
Shōwa-Sanriku earthquake caused a tsunami of up to 28.7 meters, destroying 5,000 
houses and killing 3,000 people (USGS, 2011b). And in 869AD the Jōgan-Sanriku 
earthquake, with an estimated magnitude of 8.6, probably generated a huge tsunami that 
inundated the coastal plain south of Sendai up to four kilometers inland, killing 1,000 
people (Satake et al, 2007). Indeed, Satake et al predicted that there was a 99 percent 
chance of an M8.1-8.3 earthquake occurring off the coast of Miyagi within the 
following 30 years that would probably generate a large tsunami. Although the 11 
March 2011 quake measured 9.0, it is no surprise that people question the protective 
measures adopted by TEPCO at Fukushima Daiichi, such as the height of the sea wall 
(5.7 meters) and the poor location of the backup equipment, as well as lax government 
regulations which guided TEPCO‘s disaster planning. 
 
Life in Tōhoku will never be the same. People have lost loved ones, homes, farmland, 
treasured possessions, livelihoods, and cherished family pets (Bayer, 2011). This article 
is a snapshot of conditions in Japan in early June 2011, approximately 90 days after the 
quake, and is gathered from a broad range of sources while resident in the country; from 
reading and watching press and television reports, to personal experiences and 
discussions, a small number of which were with volunteers and those affected. What the 
article lacks in completeness, therefore, it gains in immediacy and relevance for future 
disaster planning in Tōhoku and beyond. But, for our purpose here, we must now 
review conditions in Tōhoku immediately prior to the earthquake. 
 
Japan’s Shrinking Regions 
Regional Japan, meaning non-metropolitan areas including Tōhoku, had already been in 
the grip of a long-term crisis of ageing and depopulation for more than 50 years prior to 
March 2011. Its emergence had coincided with the formation of the postwar ‗1955 
system‘ and the consensus around economic expansion which became entrenched under 
the ‗iron-triangle‘ of a Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) led government, the state 
bureaucracy with the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI – now METI) 
at its core, and the nation‘s industrial elites (Author, 2011; Johnson, 1982; Masumi, 
1988; McCormack, 2002). The combined effects of chronic population out-migration 
and low fertility have left nearly every regional settlement in Japan shrinking in size, 
and weakening in its socioeconomic vitality. Now that the nation‘s population has also 
begun to shrink, the few opportunities that remain for regional communities to build 
resilience are disappearing as urban centres compete to become Japan‘s 21st century 
‗creative cities‘ (Author, 2011; Landry, 2008; Lim, 2008; Sasaki, 2007). 
 
Figure 1 shows demographic data from 1950 to 2010 and population projections from 
2010 to 2050. Maps 2 and 3 present population change in Japan by prefecture and 
prefectural capital between 1990 and 2010 (Map 2), with present population trends 
projected to 2030 (Map 3). From the data we can observe three major demographic 
outcomes facing Japan and Tōhoku in the 21st century. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Actual (1950-2000), Estimated (2010), and Projected (2020+) Populations of 
Japan by Age Group (left hand scale, in millions), and Total Population and Labour 
Force (right hand scale, in millions). 
Source: Statistics Bureau (2011a) and (2011b); NIPSSR (2011) (medium variant 
projections). 
 
First, the window of opportunity for rapid economic expansion that the 20
th
 century 
demographic dividend provided Japan has now gone into reverse, as the working age 
and children‘s populations shrink in favour of a dramatic expansion in the proportion of 
older people (Figure 1). Indeed, Japan‘s demographic decline might itself be seen as a 
consequence of the rapid expansion that the country experienced in the mid-20
th
 century, 
producing as it did an equally rapid and sustained slowdown in fertility as living 
standards rose (see, Bloom et al, 2003). The decline of the national population and 
labour force is expected to continue for three decades at least, reducing socio-economic 
capacity as well as the state‘s financial flexibility. 
 
  
Map 2: Population change in Japan by prefecture and prefectural capital, 1990-2010. 
 
Source: Statistics Bureau (2011a). 
 
Second, until recently depopulation was confined to peripheral regions, as Japan‘s 
megacities and regional centres benefited from rural-urban migration (Author, 2011; 
Map 1). It could be argued that rural shrinkage is but an unfortunate consequence of 
national economic expansion, in which all Japanese eventually benefit. However, it 
might be said that urban areas have grown at the expense of demographic shrinkage and 
socio-economic decline in rural locales, as human capital transferred into the country‘s 
megacities to power the factories that drove the ‗economic miracle‘ (Author, 2011). 
Under national depopulation that scenario of rural shrinkage powering urban and 
national growth becomes unsustainable, as depopulation broadens to include urban 
centres (Map 3). Hence, rural communities now face the debilitating prospect of 
competing against the country‘s cities, as well as each other, in a zero-sum game 
whereby one settlement‘s gain becomes another‘s loss. 
Map 3: Projected population of Japan by prefecture and prefectural capital, 2010-30. 
 
Source: NIPSSR (2003). 
 
Third, in Tōhoku itself, between 2000 and 2010 the combined populations of Iwate, 
Miyagi and Fukushima Prefectures shrank by 3.5 percent, from 5.908 to 5.708 million 
people (Statistics Bureau, 2011a). Prior to the earthquake, the Japanese government had 
forecast that by 2030 the three would shrink a further 791,000 to 4.917 million (13.9%); 
making a total decline of 16.8 percent (NIPSSR, 2003). It is almost certain that the 11 
March disaster will have made the anticipated depopulation more severe, with a total 
fall of 20 percent (1.181 million) by 2030 being plausible. 
 
Rural regions are also at the centre of another slowly developing crisis in Japan; the 
parlous state of the nation‘s finances. As early as the 1960s rural decline as a 
consequence of depopulation had become recognized officially, and the government 
began to sink money into regeneration initiatives such as the jiba sangyō shinkō jigyō 
(Regional Industry Promotion Projects), and the isson ippin (One Village One Product) 
movement of the 1970s (Knight, 1994). While such measures have been part of policy 
approaches to rural decline since that time, in their aggregate they have not only 
provided almost no beneficial outcomes, they may have made the situation worse. 
 
Even as government debt spirals beyond 200 percent of GDP (Nakamoto, 2011) the 
central government continues to pour money into rural infrastructure, ostensibly to 
provide employment and boost local economies, but also to oil a co-dependent system 
of patronage and payback (Author, 2011; Feldhoff, 2005; McCormack, 2001 and 2002). 
In the course of building nearly 100 regional airports, 14,000km of expressways, and 
more than 2,600 dams this ‗construction state‘ has accumulated huge debts, often with 
little thought as to whether facilities were needed, while the real concerns of rural 
people went unheard. Within this emerging system, municipalities felt encouraged and 
then coerced into taking on more debt than they could sensibly handle in order to 
maintain their status as shrinking communities and continue receiving subsidies 
(Author, 2011; Feldhoff, 2002; Katayama, 2008; McCormack, 2002; Mizohata, 2010; 
MLIT, 2011; Yoshimura et al, 2005). The spectacular collapse of Yūbari City in 
Hokkaido is but one, rather extreme, example of a nationwide crisis in which thousands 
of communities have either vanished entirely, been merged with stronger neighbours to 
avoid collapse, or even been sold by their residents for a better life elsewhere (Author, 
2011; BBC, 2004; Seaton, 2010). 
 
Into these unfolding crises have come the Great East Japan Earthquake, tsunami and 
nuclear meltdown, to deal the Tōhoku region the greatest blow to its vitality in historical 
memory. Having destroyed significant portions of three prefectures, the disaster raises 
many difficult questions about the structure of governance and policy-making in Japan, 
the direction of Japan‘s postwar development, and the degree to which reconstruction 
plans are affordable and realistic. The rest of the article will explore these issues by 
examining the magnitude of the disaster and an analysis of major issues that it exposes. 
The concluding discussion will tie together the themes covered and address the three 
principles of a safe, sustainable, and compassionate society that Prime Minister Naoto 
Kan has put forward as his vision for the post-quake reconstruction. 
The Magnitude of the Disaster 
On 13 March PM Kan described the challenges presented by the Great East Japan 
Earthquake as the toughest crisis that the Japanese people have faced since the Second 
World War (BBC, 2011b). Nevertheless, Japan has overcome huge disasters in the past. 
The Great Kanto Earthquake of 1923 killed 142,800 people, with most of the region‘s 
infrastructure being destroyed either in the earthquake itself or the ensuing fires (USGS, 
2011b). Millions of Japanese lost their lives in the Second World War, and the American 
strategic bombing campaign not only razed Tokyo and Yokohama once more, but also 
flattened more than 60 cities, killing over 500,000 people (Caidin, 1960). Then, of 
course, there were the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 
1945. 
 
Japan‘s cities were rebuilt quickly, and by the early-1950s the country had recovered its 
growth trajectory such that by the 1980s it was being praised as having the most vibrant 
economy in the world (Vogel, 1979). Later, in 1995 the Great Hanshin Earthquake killed 
5,502 and injured 36,896 (USGS, 2011b), devastating Kobe and requiring probably the 
most expensive reconstruction operation in world history, costing approximately USD64 
billion in damage to capital stock; though the regional economy had almost completely 
recovered within 15 months of the disaster (Horwich, 2000).  
 
Without wishing to portray the Japanese people as the victims on all these occasions, 
each time they have responded positively and vigorously to their adversities. The 
Japanese are a resourceful and knowledgeable people, and possess deep wells of 
self-discipline and determination, and these attributes will stand them in good stead. 
Japan and Tōhoku will survive. The question then becomes, how and in what form, 
given that both were shrinking prior to March 2011? 
 
On 11 April the government announced the formation of an earthquake Reconstruction 
Design Council, which had its inaugural meeting on 14 April (Prime Minister‘s Office, 
2011a). Headed by Professor Makoto Iokibe, President of the National Defense 
Academy, the Council has been assigned the ambitious task of designing a ‗grand 
vision‘ for the reconstruction of Tōhoku which is not ‗stuck with[in] a traditional 
framework‘, and which would be ‗highly regarded in history‘ (Prime Minister‘s Office, 
2011b). Professor Iokibe was involved in city planning for Kobe after the Great Hanshin 
Earthquake, and the Council and sub-committee is composed of experts from relevant 
fields, including architect Tadao Ando, who also worked on the Hanshin reconstruction 
plans, and Professor Takashi Mikuriya of Tokyo University, who has researched the 
Great Kanto and Great Hanshin Earthquakes (Prime Minister‘s Office, 2011b, p. 2). 
 
In its rapid response to the initial humanitarian crisis in Tōhoku, the government 
appears to have learned from the Kanto and Hanshin earthquakes where, in the latter 
case, even yakuza crime syndicate members were reported to have rendered assistance 
more rapidly than the JSDF, and the government refused desperately needed offers of 
overseas assistance (Fukushima, 1995). Moreover, the poor initial response was later 
compounded by a top-down approach to reconstruction that favoured infrastructure 
recovery over human welfare, and which did not leverage the event into an opportunity 
to tread a new path in Japan‘s development (McCormack, 1996; Miyamoto, 1996). 
Early indications suggest that the Design Council has transferred lessons from Tokyo 
and Kobe for the post-disaster reconstruction planning phase too, when on 14 April 
Iokibe announced after the council‘s first meeting that it had developed the following 
five point basic approach (Prime Minister‘s Office, 2011a: 2). 
 
1. The Council should not be partisan. 
2. Discussions should have ‗local ownership‘. 
3. Discussions should result in ‗creative‘ outcomes. 
4. Plans should have nationwide support. 
5. The plan should give ‗hope for the future‘. 
 
In addition, the government has established an office for managing the economic 
impacts of the nuclear crisis, which will work with TEPCO to compensate those 
affected. TEPCO has offered JPY1 million as a preliminary payment to each household 
directly affected (TEPCO, 2011b), and outlined a plan for those who have suffered 
losses due to negative rumours, such as tourism businesses in Fukushima Prefecture and 
farmers and fishermen in Fukushima, Ibaraki, Gunma, and Tochigi, and some areas of 
Chiba (Daily Yomiuri, 2011). A nationwide Disaster Reconstruction Tax and reforms to 
the existing tax system are being discussed, and Kan is basing his thinking on the 
assumption that this is a national-scale disaster in which all Japanese citizens have a 
role. 
 
Although the wider economic impacts are substantial, they are not catastrophic: Tōhoku 
accounts for just 6.4 percent of Japan‘s GDP (Dickie, 2011). Thus, while Honda 
reported on 28 April that quarterly results for June 2011 would show a 50 percent 
production decline (NHK, 2011d), on 1 June Toyota announced that its worldwide year 
on year sales for 2011 would match 2010, indicating a sharp rebound (Dawson, 2011). 
However, the number of domestic and foreign tourists has dropped, by 50.3 percent in 
March and 62.5 percent in April 2011 (JNTO, 2011), and farming and fishing 
communities in Tōhoku have suffered income losses due to radiation and loss of public 
trust in food safety. Livestock within the evacuation zone has also been abandoned, 
leading to starvation and, after 24 April, culling (Jiji Press, 2011); while animals that 
remain alive have lost their economic value. 
 
In April 2011 the Bank of Japan downgraded its quarterly assessments for seven of 
Japan‘s nine regions, citing supply-chain and production difficulties, as well as cautious 
sentiment (BOJ, 2011). Early estimates put the recovery cost at USD200 billion 
(Economist, 2011), but this will rise, as the nuclear cleanup and decommissioning were 
not included in these calculations. Power shortages will also slow recovery. The 
disaster, and the mounting inherited problems of the postwar system that it unveils, has 
even prompted Takashi Mikuriya to urge for its recognition as a watershed event; the 
end of the ‗postwar‘ and beginning of the ‗post-disaster‘ era (Dickie, 2011). But, when 
we consider that the economic cost will be in the region of 3-5 percent of GDP, as 
against 86 and 29 percent for previous watershed events such as the Second World War 
and Great Kanto Earthquake respectively, is it more realistic to conclude that this 
disaster was actually too small for the emergence of the conditions necessary for the 
era-changing experience that Mikuriya calls for (Dickie, 2011)? Instead, might this 
crisis come to be seen as a major staging post along the long route of regional decline 
that began with the establishment of the 1955 system? 
(Re)Constructing Tōhoku: An Initial Assessment 
To begin with, it is likely that municipal boundaries in Tōhoku will have to be redrawn, 
and that some destroyed communities in low-lying areas will be amalgamated into 
‗compact‘ towns and relocated to higher ground (NHK, 2011a). Public infrastructure 
may be scaled down to account for community shrinkage prior to and after the 
earthquake (NHK, 2011a). Reconstruction will also need to acknowledge the high 
proportion of older residents with special needs (NHK, 2011a). Beyond this it is still 
unclear how the built environment will be redesigned, what considerations the design 
will be based upon, and what levels of investment are needed to protect from future 
disasters. 
 
As an example of what is under consideration, on 14 April 2011 NHK (2011b) 
presented a report from Minamisanriku Town in Miyagi Prefecture, which was almost 
totally destroyed, with whole areas being swept away (photos 1 and 2). Miyagi 
prefectural government has produced two scenarios for the town‘s reconstruction and 
invited comments from residents and municipal officials. The plans describe the 
viability of the region‘s fisheries, and base economic recovery around marine products. 
The prefecture plans to rebuild the port, turn the low-lying coastal area into a green belt 
and park, and place residential and commercial zones on higher ground (NHK, 2011b). 
More parkland may be created on specially raised areas, and these will act as evacuation 
points. However, in its totality such a scenario may promise more in its conception than 
deliver in its execution, thereby raising public expectations to unrealistic levels; the 
town‘s population shrank 6.5 percent in just the five years between 2005 and 2010, from 
18,641 to 17,431 persons (Statistics Bureau, 2011a), and as of 11 April 2011, 9,500 
persons had been evacuated to emergency shelters, 398 were confirmed as having died, 
and 800 were missing (Asahi Shinbunsha, 2011a). In addition, the photographs show 
that the coastal area has subsided below sea level and may need to be reclaimed, and 
there is not enough contiguous flat land in the surrounding hills to rebuild the settlement 
in the way that planners envisage. 
 
 
  
Photos 1 and 2 show aerial shots of Minamisanriku Town, Miyagi Prefecture before 
(2001) and after (27 March 2011) the tsunami. 
 
Source: Sankei Shinbunsha (2011), p. 31; Also Available from: SankeiPhoto Website: 
http://photo.sankei.jp.msn.com/kodawari/data/Earthquake/201103/31/kuusatsu1/. 
Reproduced by kind permission of Sankei Books. 
Another NHK report (2011c) focused on Shichigahama Town in Miyagi, which is the 
smallest municipality by land area in Tōhoku, and whose population fell by 3.1 percent 
(from 21,068 to 20,419) between 2005 and 2010 (Statistics Bureau, 2011a). The Mayor 
says that many residents would prefer to rebuild on higher ground, but regulations 
prevent this because most of the higher land (60 percent of the town‘s land area) lies 
within an urbanization restricted zone created to preserve its natural beauty and ecology. 
This area is noted for its tourism potential, which the local authorities want to develop, 
but which might be compromised by the location of residential communities. There 
exists a tension, therefore, between the need to redesign the built environment on higher 
ground, and the wish to retain the area‘s natural heritage and develop its tourism 
potential (NHK, 2011c). The question that emerges is: to what extent do reconstruction 
authorities prioritize the long-term survivability of human settlements that were already 
shrinking prior to the disaster over the sustainability of the region‘s environment, on 
which the residents also depend for their survival and prosperity? 
 
The same report moves on to Yamada Town, Iwate Prefecture, where almost the entire 
town was submerged and has effectively ceased to exist (NHK, 2011c). The fishing 
industry has gone and the town lacks the finances even for a modest start in rebuilding. 
The town‘s tax revenues total approximately JPY1.2 billion in a normal year, but in 
2011 condolence money for deaths due to the disaster will cost JPY1 billion. The mayor 
says that bold measures are needed if Yamada is to survive, but that the regulatory and 
tax structures do not allow for the special measures needed by these communities 
(NHK, 2011c). 
 
The historic settlement of Kamaishi City is located along the scenic Sanriku coast, 
which is characterized by a series of rias which offer natural harbors and shelter (at least 
from storms) for coastal communities, and which provide ideal geographical and 
ecological conditions for marine products industries (photos 3 and 4). The city had 
recently completed construction of a USD1.5bn defense breakwater, reputedly the 
deepest in the world, as part of the its revitalization and disaster prevention plans; its 
population has also been declining; by a staggering 7.9 percent between 2005 and 2010 
(Statistics Bureau, 2011a). The main populated area of the city, along with the famous 
Kamaishi steel works, is located at the head of a ria and it is likely that, as the tsunami 
advanced it was ‗funneled‘, raising its height, and breaching the breakwater destroying 
the port area (Onishi, 2011). Because the port buildings had also been compacted by the 
narrow topography and were densely nestled on the valley floor, the water level was 
probably forced still higher as it advanced inland and through the narrow streets. 
Reports suggest that the tsunami measured 9 meters in the port area (Asahi Shinbunsha, 
2011a); though, a massive tsunami of up to 20m or more appears to have inundated 
smaller communities along the coast, such as Unosumai (photos 3 and 4)(Nakamura, 
2011). Fujii and Satake‘s (2011) simulated tsunami calculations show the maximum 
height along the coast of Kamaishi passing 25 meters and going off the scale on two 
occasions. 
 
In April it was estimated that 1,308 people were either dead or missing in Kamaishi, 
rendering a staggering 11 percent aggregate decline in the population since 2005 (Asahi 
Shimbusha, 2011a). Moreover, many citizens currently housed cheek by jowl for 
months in emergency shelters are doubtless currently pondering their futures, while 
others have already moved away for good. Low-lying parts of the city, including areas 
which had been inundated in previous tsunami, have been swept away. Farmland has 
been rendered unusable by seawater, subsidence, and the deposition of ocean sludge. 
The city‘s fishing fleet, on which much ‗hope‘ for community revitalization had been 
placed (Genda and Nakamura, 2009; Nakamura, 2008) is destroyed. Ships have been 
dumped inland, with one 6,000 ton freighter, the MV Asia Symphony, left straddling the 
port wall (Gilligan, 2011). 
 
  
Photos 3 and 4 show aerial shots of the Unosumai district of Kamaishi City, Iwate 
Prefecture before (2007) and after (29 March 2011) the tsunami. 
 
Source: Sankei Shinbunsha (2011), p. 31; Also. Available from: SankeiPhoto Website: 
http://photo.sankei.jp.msn.com/kodawari/data/Earthquake/201103/31/kuusatsu1/. 
Reproduced by kind permission of Sankei Books. 
Despite the damage and debris, and the procedural and regulatory obstacles, recovery 
has begun. Nippon Steel restarted its Kamaishi works on 12 April using previously 
accumulated inventory; but it is uncertain how long the plant will remain open (Kyodo 
News, 2011b). Many of the employees are either dead or missing. 42,000 people in 
Iwate alone have lost their jobs and are receiving benefits which can be claimed for a 
maximum of 360 days (NHK, 2011e). Though Kamaishi was known for difficult 
employment conditions due to the run-down of the steel works (Nakamura, 2008), the 
pre-11 March 731 businesses employing approximately 9,000 people in the city have 
been reduced to 413 businesses employing 4,000. Most of these are small enterprises 
and have no income to pay wages or service debt, yet employees need wages to pay 
mortgages and for purchasing goods and services from local stores. A vicious cycle of 
economic collapse awaits unless cash begins to flow through Kamaishi‘s ruined 
economy. 
 
Competition for land for reconstruction is already evident in Kamaishi. Ruined 
businesses need raised flat land serviced by utilities to rebuild factories and warehouses, 
and they need to do this within 360 days to retain employees, upon whose knowledge 
businesses depend. However, the city government‘s priority is to use flat land in higher 
areas for 3,000 units of emergency housing (NHK, 2011e). Although neither Kamaishi 
nor Tōhoku have disappeared, much work remains in resolving the contradictions 
involved in community reconstruction in this already depopulating and economically 
depressed region. 
 
One idea for how reconstruction might proceed has emerged from Shimabara City in 
Nagasaki Prefecture, which was deluged by water and volcanic debris during the 
eruptions of Mt. Unzen in the 1990s. There, affected housing was raised by 9 meters by 
laying compacted debris and soil. However, the report noted that these measures cost 
more than JPY9 billion, and the area concerned is far smaller than that affected in 
Tōhoku (NHK, 2011b), being only one part of a single settlement. It is doubtful, 
therefore, that land-raising and community reconstruction of this type will be employed 
across Tōhoku. More likely is that a range of options will be implemented according to 
risk assessment and cost considerations. For example, many taller concrete structures 
such as public buildings, offices and apartment blocks managed to survive even the 
fiercest assault by the tsunami (see photos). Replacing densely packed low-level 
housing in port areas with widely spaced apartment blocks surrounded by gardens, 
leaving the bottom two floors for car parking, may be more cost-effective than, and just 
as safe as, moving the community onto artificially raised land. Liquefaction. 
 
While the idea of relocating residents into compact communities on raised land appears 
ideal many problems and contradictions lie along the route to achieving this. Given the 
existing topography, it is difficult to see where these new communities can be located, if 
we consider the number of people and the associated public infrastructure and industrial 
and commercial zones (see photos). Japan‘s rural and coastal landscape, or the satoyama 
and satoumi, has been carved as much by humans as by nature, with broad flat silted 
valleys at or near sea level made suitable for wet rice cultivation surrounded by steep 
forested mountainsides. Settlements have developed on the low-lying areas because 
farmers live on and alongside their land, and fishermen near their boats, and the 
mountainsides are susceptible to landslips during the torrential rains that accompany the 
autumn typhoons. 
 
There is also a danger that the overall welfare and preferences of local people will not 
be heeded. While the idealized image of the pre-modern ie and mura, or household and 
village, may be disappearing from the Japanese rural landscape in the 21
st
 century, 
planners must include citizens‘ wants and needs if the new communities are going to 
‗work‘ for local people. In particular, the emotional and psychological welfare of 
citizens in the post-disaster era needs to be considered, and especially that of older 
people. Research from Kobe will be useful for the Design Council; though the council 
will doubtless understand that Kobe is a densely populated cosmopolitan trading port. 
Tōhoku it is not. 
 
Raising Uncomfortable Questions About Governance in Postwar Japan 
The earthquake and its aftermath are a grim reminder of some deep-seated and 
uncomfortable questions that Japan‘s shrinking regions, and indeed the state and nation 
as a whole, have inherited from the 1955 settlement and which urgently demand 
answers. Of the 13,135 bodies identified and assigned a cause of death by 11 April, 65.2 
percent were aged 60 or over and 92.5 percent were by drowning (Japan Times, 2011b). 
Mainly for reasons of mobility, many older people had been unable to reach safety in 
time, and it is reasonable to assume from this that a high proportion of disabled people 
also unnecessarily fell victim. 
 
The high rate of older victims points to the presence of wide differentials within 
Japanese society, highlighting misgivings about whether the state and society offer 
adequate care and protection of the country‘s most vulnerable citizens and whether a 
society of gaps – kakusa shakai – is emerging in the 21st century (see, Yamada, 2006). 
In addition, many older people are suffering ‗relocation damage‘ from living in 
emergency shelters and being evacuated away from their homes, families and 
neighbourhoods. One group of 39 older people who were moved from a care facility in 
Minamisoma City, Fukushima Prefecture in the wake of the nuclear crisis endured 
constant anxiety, depression, and hyper-tension as they were moved first to a temporary 
evacuation facility in a nearby elementary school gymnasium that had no electricity, 
then by bus to a care facility in Yamagata Prefecture in the middle of the night, and 
finally to another facility in Minamiuonuma City in Niigata Prefecture when it became 
clear that the care facility in Yamagata, which was charging JPY300,000 per night to 
accommodate the group, would wait no longer for confirmation of who out of 
Minamisoma City or Fukushima Prefectural governments would pay for their care 
(NHK, 2011f). Group members also rarely receive visits from family members who 
endure difficult circumstances of their own; some relatives are unable to visit because 
they had abandoned their cars when they were evacuated from the radiation zone and 
are not yet permitted to retrieve them. Moreover, lack of personal care, exercise and 
entertainment in temporary accommodations add to the depression and confusion 
among the group (NHK, 2011f). 
 
The nuclear meltdown also exposes the fragility and contradictions in Japan‘s energy 
policy and the misplaced optimism of postwar assumptions that economic expansion 
and advanced technology would provide solutions to the problems associated with 
Japan‘s accelerated economic development model. Fukushima Daiichi is not the only 
nuclear facility in Japan that is vulnerable. The massive Kashiwazaki-Kariwa complex 
in Niigata Prefecture, also owned by TEPCO, sustained damage when a magnitude 6.6 
earthquake occurred close to the plant in July 2007 (USGS, 2011b). Worrying too is that 
the Hamaoka complex in Shizuoka Prefecture, owned by Chūbu Electric Power, sits 
near the Nankai Trough subduction zone, where a magnitude 8+ earthquake is predicted 
soon (Map 1) (Matsumura, 2010; McCormack, 2011). 
 
Since deep geological storage has not achieved public acceptance, the government also 
has yet to devise a long-term solution to the question of nuclear waste (and since 11 
March 2011, melted fuel and irradiated debris, soil and water). By 2008 Japan had 
accumulated 666m
3
 of high level waste and 229,000m
3
 of low and intermediate level 
(IAEA, 2011), while the country possesses 11,806m
3
 of remaining disposal capacity. 
Some of this waste will be hazardous far into the future (Pu239, the principal plutonium 
isotope in nuclear fuels, has a half life of 24,000 years; though Pu242, present in spent 
fuel at around 3-7% of Pu at discharge, has a half life of 374,000 years (WNA, 2009)). 
Hence the practice of accumulating spent fuel in pools next to nuclear reactors, which 
then presents a hazard when power plants suffer seismic damage. How did Japan‘s 
energy policy come to be so dominated by nuclear power? 
 
At the centre of Japan‘s ‗iron triangle‘ lies the nuclear industry, which is overseen by 
METI and a raft of other interwoven agencies including NISA, the agency responsible 
for ensuring nuclear safety. Instead of being independent of the government and 
TEPCO, NISA is under the direct supervision of METI, whose job is to promote the 
development of nuclear energy as well as the expansion of the electric power industry 
(Meyer, 2011; NHK, 2011g). More than any other, the nuclear industry – and TEPCO in 
particular – symbolizes the co-dependent network of relations between the government, 
bureaucracy and corporate elites; relations which are maintained and strengthened by 
the practice of amakudari (descent from heaven), whereby elite bureaucrats retire to 
lucrative advisory roles in corporations such as TEPCO, and are therefore unable to 
exercise effective control while employed in regulatory roles (Colignon and Usui, 2003; 
Duffield and Woodall, 2011; Fukue, 2011; Okuda, 2011). Indeed, within Japan‘s 
so-called ‗nuclear village‘ this network includes the scientific establishment, 
mainstream media, think tanks and advisory bodies, and even labour unions 
(Dusinberre, 2011; Meyer, 2011). 
 
Under this administrative system, nuclear energy has also been used as a proxy for 
funneling state subsidies into the regions, to generate employment and shore up an 
eroding rural political base, and for subsidizing the regional power companies; a policy 
which has long-term consequences for the vulnerability of politically weak areas to 
natural disasters. For example, in building the fuel reprocessing facility at Rokkasho in 
Aomori Prefecture, which was also developed in part to delay deciding the fate of the 
accumulating mountain of nuclear waste (McCormack, 2011), the government 
‗showered‘ the locale with ‗economic assistance‘ measures, which included JPY38 
billion given for ‗residual health risks‘ and JPY18 billion to ‗upgrade farming and 
improve village life‘ (Dauvergne, 1993, p. 587). Indeed, Rokkasho‘s development has 
reportedly cost the Japanese taxpayer around JPY19 trillion (McCormack, 2011). 
 
Emblematic of the status of the nuclear industry within the iron triangle has been the 
government responses to violations of safety procedures by TEPCO and reports of 
bureaucratic collusion between the authorities (METI and NISA) and TEPCO in 
keeping this information veiled from public view (Okuda, 2011; Onuki, 2011). 
Revelations that TEPCO had concealed evidence of cracked reactors and incorrect 
procedures at Fukushima Daiichi and Kashiwazaki-Kariwa led to the company 
eventually admitting more than 200 other incidents of false technical reporting over 
more than two decades, and which also exposed systemic lax oversight by the 
authorities in checking and investigating TEPCO‘s data submissions (Cooke, 2009; 
Meyer, 2011; Okuda, 2009). Indeed, reports that TEPCO continues not to heed safety 
concerns at the stricken Fukushima Daiichi plant mount as workers complain about 
inadequate safety equipment and that TEPCO is hiding behind contracts with 
sub-contractors, who employ so-called ‗nuclear gypsies‘ from vulnerable groups and 
discriminated communities as temporary workers, to shield itself from public scrutiny 
(Horie, 2011; Jobin, 2011). 
 
Since the 1970s, when the nuclear share of Japan‘s electricity was 3 percent, the 
government has nurtured nuclear energy under the assumption that the country lacks 
significant energy resources of its own and is therefore vulnerable to political volatility 
overseas (Kelly, 2005; Samuels, 1986). Under the government‘s now discredited 2010 
Basic Energy Plan there were plans for 14 new reactors, which would have raised the 
nuclear share from 29 percent in 2011 to 50 percent by 2030; or from 10 to 24 percent 
of Japan‘s primary energy mix (Duffield and Woodall, 2011, p. 3743; McCormack, 
2011). 
 
In a country which possesses abundant geothermal energy, an average of 1,800-2,100 
hours of sunshine per year at a latitude equal to Spain, and which possesses some of the 
most plentiful wind, tidal, and wave energy resources in Asia, it is incorrect to state that 
Japan lacks domestic energy sources. More accurately, Japan lacks fossil fuels, and the 
state has invested huge sums in developing nuclear power as a substitute while, 
according to PM Kan (2011a), the electric power companies have treated renewables as 
a ‗nuisance‘; in a country with the highest density of magnitude 8+ earthquakes in the 
world since 1900 (USGS, 2011b). In the process, the relationship between the 
government and the electric power industry has deepened, to the point of fostering what 
amounts to a catastrophic disregard for public safety, and which has crystallized in the 
accident at Fukushima Daiichi. Will the events of March 2011 come to be seen as the 
watershed moment that some have advocated, symbolizing a change of course towards a 
transparent and accountable government and nuclear industry, a conversion to clean 
renewable energies, and the restoration of hope in Japan‘s shrinking regions? 
 
Discussion: Towards the (Re)Construction of a Safe, Sustainable, and 
Compassionate Society in Japan’s Shrinking Regions 
On 11 April, one month after the earthquake, PM Kan issued an address that was carried 
in the New York Times, among other publications worldwide (Kan, 2011b; 2011c). He 
thanked those who have helped Japan face this historic crisis and he expressed deep 
regret for the nuclear accident. In assuring that Japan will contribute to preventing such 
accidents in the future, Kan presented: 
 
… a two-pronged challenge: responding to rising global energy demand and striving to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions to combat global warming. Going forward, I would 
like to present a clear vision to the world — that includes the aggressive promotion of 
clean energy — that may contribute to solving global energy issues. (Kan, 2011c) 
 
Addressing regional reconstruction, Kan wrote that ‗this difficult period‘ will provide a 
‗precious window of opportunity to secure the ―Rebirth of Japan‖‘, and that he wished 
to ‗realize a forward-looking reconstruction that gives people bright hopes for the 
future‘ (Kan, 2011c). He established three principles for the reconstruction. 
 
1. To create a regional society that is highly resistant to natural disasters. 
2. To establish a social system that allows people to live in harmony with the global 
environment. 
3. To build a compassionate society that cares about people, in particular, the 
vulnerable. 
 
Significantly, Kan does not mention the economy, instead prioritizing societal recovery 
and environmental sustainability. Moreover, he sees potential in leveraging the 
reconstruction of Tōhoku into an opportunity for treading a new path for rural Japan. 
Kan‘s vision is ambitious and, coming at a low point in Japan‘s history, it is inspiring. 
But is it realistic? 
 
Addressing Kan‘s three principles in turn, it is probable that some successes will be 
achieved, but that entrenched systems and structures will prevent a full realization. First, 
in terms of disaster preparedness and community safety, central and municipal 
governments have learnt from the past and this process is ongoing. Existing defensive 
infrastructure is being improved, such as at Hamaoka, and new defenses being built. 
Mistakes in tsunami evacuation are being examined and procedures being enhanced. 
New technologies are being developed and employed. Beyond this, community 
reconstruction will also make some settlements safer by building compact communities 
on higher land, and by developing safer buildings and neighbourhoods in low-lying 
areas. The top-down delivery of ‗hard‘ reconstruction will be efficient and effective; 
Japan‘s ‗construction state‘ is geared for precisely this task. 
However, only so much can be done within the financial, technological and topographic 
limits of early 21
st
 century Japan, and expectations have been raised, perhaps 
unrealistically. There will be competition for financial, material, technical, labour and 
land resources within Tōhoku as the reconstruction gets under way, and between 
Tōhoku and other shrinking regions in Japan, which will drive up costs and constrain 
the speed and scope of the recovery. It is also certain that disasters will occur again, 
though perhaps with fewer losses. Worrying, therefore, is the fact that Japan appears to 
be entering an era of greater seismic intensity (Ishibashi, 2011; USGS, 2011b), which 
will require proportionately greater investment in defences. 
 
As we have seen, ahead lie many hurdles and contradictions, some human-made, that 
must be negotiated for successful ‗hard‘ reconstruction to take hold. Pragmatic 
compromises between divergent interests, established procedures and regulations, and 
deeply held principles will be required. It is likely that, under these circumstances, some 
citizens and communities will be disappointed, and that environmental needs will be 
subordinated to re-establishing housing, infrastructure, and community functions. 
Moreover, with the country struggling under massive debts and the national population 
ageing and shrinking, it is unrealistic to hope that reconstruction in Tōhoku can be 
transposed into a generalized revitalization of rural Japan. More realistic, in fact, is the 
potential for further decline. 
 
The second principle is more difficult to assess, partly because it is unclear what 
constitutes living in ‗harmony with the global environment.‘ Looking only at electricity 
generation and consumption, Japan is already comparatively energy efficient, but the 
loss of nuclear capacity will require, in the medium-term, increased dependence on 
fossil fuels. Hence, the government has asked for a 15 percent reduction in personal 
consumption. Given the measures already implemented – from wearing looser clothing 
through using fewer escalators, lifts, and lights – and the high degree of public 
cooperation, this may be achieved. Over the longer term, it is also possible that Japanese 
will be moved to reconsider and change their lifestyles. 
 
Encouraging is the news that the government will review energy policy and intends to 
develop renewables to 20 percent of electricity generation by the 2020s (Ito, 2011). But, 
to what degree will fossil fuel consumption be reduced? The government will not 
abandon nuclear energy, but the loss of a planned 7.456GW at Fukushima Daiichi, less 
nuclear capacity elsewhere, and the difficulty of persuading municipalities to accept 
new stations and/or reactors, will all restrict Japan‘s ability to replace fossil fuels. 
Moreover, a shift towards renewables will not come about suddenly, and will cost 
money that Japan needs for recovery and reconstruction. 
 
Third, achieving a compassionate society via the ‗soft‘ reconstruction of Tōhoku‘s 
broken communities will be challenging; the proportion of older people in Japan is set 
to rise beyond 30 percent in the coming decade, and to more than 50 percent in many 
rural areas. There is therefore space for civil society groups to fill the widening gap 
between state objectives and the willingness of taxpayers to fund them. In addition, 
there are growing demands for greater public consultation in municipal governance and 
planning. But progress in achieving community involvement has been slow and 
top-down local governance mechanisms still predominate (Sorensen and Funk, 2007). 
Although the spontaneous appearance of volunteer groups after the Hanshin earthquake 
was remarkable and their role has been prominent in Tōhoku, the evidence suggests that 
the authorities are happy for volunteers and civil society groups to assist during 
disasters, but less so in normal times. However, the physiological and psychological 
effects of this disaster on victims will be deep and long-lasting, and experience from 
Kobe shows that post-traumatic stresses may increase in intensity and scope if not 
adequately tackled (Iwai, 1999). The combined needs of the affected communities in 
Tōhoku are very great, and cannot be quickly resolved. Civil society groups should be 
encouraged to remain involved over the long term, first, in order for the short-term ‗soft‘ 
reconstruction in Tōhoku to achieve success and, second, for the participation of civil 
groups in social maintenance and improvement to become normalized across the 
country over the longer term. 
 
To that end, it is worth noting that since the early Meiji period (1868-1912), Japan‘s 
development has been achieved via a top-down programme of purposive accelerated 
socio-cultural modernization and economic expansion (Tominaga, 1990). This required 
the development of a set of institutions that could execute the government‘s strategic 
vision through a coordinated mobilization of the nation‘s resources and people. Since 
that time Japan has not wavered from this path. In the postwar era the ‗iron triangle‘ of 
political, bureaucratic and corporate elites became institutionalized such that its 
structure and behaviour is now deeply embedded within the nation‘s culture. Japan does 
not right now have a culture or set of institutional arrangements to be able to realise a 
bottom up reconstruction process. Such a reversal in the principles and structure of 
national and local governance requires deep cultural shifts as well as an organic, and at 
times chaotic and confrontational, process of institutional evolution. Civil society does 
not just happen, it must be achieved; and it also cannot and will not be mandated into 
existence via a sort of self-contradictory orgasm of political self-destruction on the part 
of the government and bureaucracy. Although Japan has been progressing towards a 
more open and accountable system, and the disaster in Tōhoku will doubtless hasten 
this, it will require vigilance, struggle and time – perhaps the passing of a generation – 
to play out. 
 
Conclusion: Watershed or Marker? Acknowledging the 11 March 2011 Disaster as 
a ‘Moment’ in Japan’s History 
On 7 June 2011 the Japanese government submitted a report to the IAEA on the nuclear 
meltdown, acknowledging that ‗consistent preparation for severe accidents was 
insufficient‘ and listing 28 lessons learned from the accident; including lax requirements 
on TEPCO to ensure safety at its reactors (Prime Minister‘s Office, 2011c, p. 41). 
Separately, on 24 May the government had established a third-party panel to investigate 
the events at Fukushima. Headed by Professor Emeritus Yotaro Hatamura of Tokyo 
University, an expert on accidents and organizational failures, the 12 member panel will 
submit its final report in the summer of 2012 (NHK, 2011g). Among four areas of 
enquiry, one will examine social and systematic factors, including the involvement of 
political circles, administrative organizations and private enterprises over a span of 
thirty to forty years. Another will investigate safety procedures and regulatory systems, 
including the role of NISA. PM Kan wishes the committee to place everything and 
everyone, including himself, under close scrutiny; while Hatamura has stressed that the 
panel will not be influenced by special interests (NHK, 2011g). However, the 
government has not given the panel legal powers to require testimony or force the 
submission of documents and, in order to promote transparency no one‘s testimony will 
be subject to legal prosecution (Japan Times, 2011c). 
 
The 11 March triple disaster was a ‗moment‘ in Japan‘s history. Whether it will come to 
be regarded as a watershed event will depend on four outcomes. First, the extent to 
which ‗hard‘ and ‗soft‘ reconstruction solutions in Tōhoku will be made possible, and 
then transferred to other shrinking regions, is dependent on the recommendations of the 
Reconstruction Design Council. Second, the development of a transparent and 
accountable nuclear industry as a step towards the deconstruction of the iron-triangle 
will depend on the recommendations of the nuclear accident investigation panel. Third, 
the implementation of these two committees‘ recommendations will depend upon which 
party is in government and who is Prime Minister. Naoto Kan is likely to resign before 
autumn 2011, and the LDP may force a general election that returns them to power. 
With its roots in the formation of the 1955 system, the LDP‘s enthusiasm for a break-up 
of the iron-triangle is open to suspicion. Fourth, the development of a civil society 
which can hold the government to account on its promises depends on the willingness 
of ordinary citizens to enforce their beliefs and values on the political, bureaucratic and 
corporate elites, not on the top-down imposition of government decree, however benign; 
such a process would be self-contradictory. This can come, among other methods, 
through the deployment of effective citizen challenge via the legal system. If TEPCO, 
NISA, METI and other bodies are shielded such that those affected by the disaster 
cannot somehow assert their moral right to be recognized legally as victims, then the 
Japanese people may lose the opportunity to transform the earthquake, tsunami and 
nuclear meltdown into a watershed event. Instead, 11 March 2011 may come to be 
regarded as but one more (major) marker along the road towards the collapse of Japan‘s 
rural society. 
 
In concluding this article I wish to express my deepest sympathies and condolences to 
the victims of the Great East Japan Earthquake, and to add my contribution towards the 
restoration of a vibrant society in Tōhoku, the revitalization of Japan‘s shrinking 
regions, and a fundamental re-ordering of Japanese political life. 
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1 Electricity distribution in Japan is divided into two regions, which are separated along a 
line that cuts roughly midway across the island of Honshu. North-east of this frequency 
divide electricity is distributed at 50Hz, whereas south-west of the divide it is 60Hz. 
Hokkaido is within the 50Hz region, but the cable linking Hokkaido with Honshu under the 
Tsugaru Straits has limited capacity of approximately 600MW. 
